The robustness of a network of networks (NON) under random attack has been studied recently [J. Gao et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 107, 195701 (2011)]. Understanding how robust a NON is to targeted attacks is a major challenge when designing resilient infrastructures. We address here the question how the robustness of a NON under targeted attack is affected by targeted attack on high or low degree nodes. We introduce a targeted attack probability function that is dependent upon node degree, and study the robustness of two types of NON under targeted attack: (i) a tree of n fully interdependent Erdős-Rényi or scale-free networks, and (ii) a starlike network of n partially interdependent Erdős-Rényi networks. For any tree of n fully interdependent Erdős-Rényi networks and scale-free networks under targeted attack, we find that the network becomes significantly more vulnerable when nodes of higher degree have higher probability to fail. When the probability that a node will fail is proportional to its degree, for a NON composed of Erdős-Rényi networks we find analytical solutions for the mutual giant component P∞ as a function of p, where 1 − p is the initial fraction of failed nodes in each network. We also find analytical solutions for the critical fraction pc, which causes the fragmentation of the n interdependent networks, and for the minimum average degreekmin below which the NON will collapse even if only a single node fails. For a starlike NON of n partially interdependent Erdős-Rényi networks under targeted attack, we find the critical coupling strength qc for different n. When q > qc, the attacked system undergoes an abrupt first order type transition. When q ≤ qc, the system displays a smooth second order percolation transition. We also evaluate how the central network becomes more vulnerable as the number of networks with the same coupling strength q increases. The limit of q = 0 represents no dependency, and the results are consistent with the classical percolation theory of a single network under targeted attack.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Most studies of complex networks over the last decade have focused on single networks that do not interact with other networks . Most real-world networks, however, are actually "networks of networks" and are made up of two or more networks that interact and are interdependent. Examples include various infrastructures such as water and food supply networks, communication networks, fuel networks, financial transaction networks, and power-station networks [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] . Recently, Buldyrev et al. [27] developed a theoretical framework for studying the robustness of two fully interdependent networks subject to random attack. They found that due to the dependency coupling between networks, they become extremely vulnerable to random failures and the system collapse in an abrupt first order transition. Parshani et al. [28] generalized this framework and investigated networks that are only partially interdependent. They found that reducing the coupling strength could lead to a change from first order (abrupt) to a second order (continuous) percolation transition due to random attack. Recently Gao et al. [29] generalized this theory to include the "network of networks" (NON) case-to a system of n interacting networks. They developed an analytical framework for studying percolation under random failures and presented exact analytical solutions for an interdependent NON system. The results for a NON suggest that the classical percolation theory extensively studied in physics and mathematics is a limiting case of n = 1 of the general case of percolation in a NON. For more recent studies of a NON, see Refs. [16, 30] . In real-world scenarios, however, failures may not be random but may be the result of a targeted attack on specific central nodes [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] . Huang et al. [31] studied the robustness of two interdependent networks when high or low degree nodes are under targeted attack by mapping the targetedattack problem in interdependent networks to the random-attack problem. They found that interdependent scale-free (SF) networks are difficult to defend using strategies such as protecting the high-degree nodes. In this paper by introducing a probability function of targeted attack, we study the robustness of a NON system of any tree of n fully interdependent networks and of a starlike NON structure of n partially interdependent networks (see Fig. 1 
II. THE MODEL
Gallos et al. [35] proposed a probability function for a targeted attack on an isolated single network,
, which represents the probability that a node with degree k i will be removed. For the case α < 0, it was assumed that k i = 0. This function was used to study the robustness of a single scale-free network to different attack strategies [35] , but in a system comprised of interdependent networks, zero-degree nodes strongly influence overall system robustness. In order to understand the robustness of a NON under targeted attack and to solve the problem analytically we must avoid singularities for k i = 0 in W α (k i ). We thus propose a new probability function for targeted attack that represents the probability that a node i with degree k i has been removed,
When α < 0, nodes with higher k i are protected and nodes with lower k i have a higher probability of failure. In order to avoid singularities for k i = 0 and α < 0, the term k i + 1 is taken. When α > 0, nodes with higher k i have a higher probability of failure and are therefore vulnerable. The case α → ∞, corresponds to the targeted attack case where nodes are removed in strict order, from high degree to low degree. When α = 0, all nodes in the networks have the same probability of failure, W 0 = 1 N , and the nodes are removed at random. The important special case = 1 corresponds to the acquaintance immunization strategy [13, 31, 32, 35] and can be solved analytically.
We assume that in an attack, a fraction of nodes 1 − p i according to Eq. (1) in each network i is removed and only nodes which belong to the giant connected component of each network i remain functional. The failure of these nodes causes further failures in other networks and vice versa [27] [28] [29] 36] , resulting in a cascade of failures. We now describe the generating function and the giant component of one network i in the NON after a fraction of nodes are removed with a probability W α (k i ), which can be applied to all networks in the NON system. The generating function of the degree distribution of network i is defined
where P i (k) is the degree distribution of network i. The generating function of the associated branching process is, [27-29, 31, 32, 40, 42] . The average degree of network i isk i = k P i (k)k. We follow an approach similar to that of attacking a pair of coupled networks [31] .
Applying Eq. (1), after removing a fraction of 1 − p i of nodes of network i but keeping the edges of the remaining nodes, the degree distribution P pi (k) of the remaining nodes is
where A pi (k) is the number of nodes with degree k in network i. When one more node is removed, A pi (k) changes to
In the limit N → ∞, the derivative of A pi (k) with respect to p i is obtained from Eq. (4),
By differentiating Eq. (3) with respect p i and using Eq. (5), we obtain,
In order to solve Eq. (6), we define [31, 32, 38] . We find the solution of Eq. (6) to be
which can be shown to satisfy Eq. (6). After removing a fraction 1 − p i of nodes from network i according to Eq. (1) and their links, the generating function of the nodes left in network i is
In this step, after removing the links between removed nodes and remaining nodes, the generating function of network i composed of the remaining nodes is [42, 43] ,
wherep i is the ratio between the number of links of the remaining nodes and the number of original links in network i,p
wherek(p i ) = k P pi (k)k is the average degree of the remaining nodes in network i.
If we find the generating functionG i0 (x) of networkĩ after randomly removing the 1 − p i fraction of nodes, the new generating function of the remaining nodes is the same as G ic (x). The targeted-attack problem on network i is mapped to a random-attack problem on networkĩ, by solving the equationG i0 (1
The generating function of the associated branching process is [42, 43] ,
.
(13) of nodes that belongs to the giant component is given by
where
In particular, for the case α = 1, from Eqs. (9), (10), and (12),
where u i satisfies
Next we apply the framework of the n equations developed in Ref. [36] to the no-feedback condition. The n unknowns x t,i represent the fraction of nodes that survived in network i at step t of the cascading failures after removing the failed nodes and the nodes dependent upon the failed nodes in the other networks,
where for t = 1, x t,i = p i , and
The terms y t,ji represent the fraction of nodes in network j that survive after the damage from all the networks connected to j is taken into account (except from network i at stage t of the cascading failure) and y t=1,ji = p j . The giant component of each network i at t stage of cascading failures can also be found from the equation
where g i (x t,i ) is the fraction of the remaining nodes of network i at t stage of cascading failures that are part of its giant component. When t → ∞, the cascading failures have ended and the final giant component of network i is
, where
where x i is calculated over the K networks interlinked with network i by partial dependency links q ji . The terms y ji represent the fraction of nodes in network j surviving after the damage from all the connected networks to network j except from network i is taken into account [29, 36, 40] . When the dependency has a feedback between two interdependent networks, Eq. (23) becomes simpler as y ji = x j [40] . We next address two cases of n coupled networks: (i) a treelike NON with fully interdependent networks, and (ii) a starlike NON with partially interdependent networks. We now analyze the specific classes of a treelike NON formed of Erdős-Rényi (ER) or scale-free (SF) networks [2, 3, 10, 11, 27, 31] . By using the dynamics of cascading failures shown in Fig. 2 , we first compare our theoretical results of Eqs. (16)- (20) with simulation results shown in Fig. 3 for a NON formed of five ER networks and SF networks. The theory is in excellent agreement with simulations. For the case of treelike NON formed of n ER networks, the generating function of the ER network is G i0 (x) = ek i(x−1) . From Eqs. (13), (18)- (20), we obtainG i0 (x) =G i1 (x) = ek . From Eqs. (14)- (15), we can get g i (
For a treelike NON with fully interdependent, q ij = q ji = 1, we get
When
Then, from Eq. (27), we obtain
From Eqs. (29) and (30), we can get
The size of the mutual giant component for all value of p,k, u and n becomes
Let r = e
n , then r = f n , and the critical value of p = p c can be found,
Substituting Eq. (34) into Eq. (29), we can get the critical value of f = f c
where the solution can be expressed in terms of the Lambert function W (x), f c = −[nW (− As an important characteristic of percolation theory, the critical threshold p c is analyzed to study the robustness of a fully interdependent treelike NON in Figs. 5(a)-5(f). The threshold p c as a function of α obtained from Eqs. (9)- (15) and (23)- (24) is shown in Fig. 5(a) . Figure 5(a) shows that the critical fraction p c continuously increases with α for a different number n of networks, which means that the NON becomes more vulnerable when the nodes with higher k have a higher probability of failure. Figures 5(b) and 5(c) show that the NON becomes less robust with increasing n. Moreover, for fixed n, p c decreases whenk increases as seen in Figs. 5(b)-5(f). Furthermore, for a fixed n, whenk is smaller than the minimum average degreek min (n), p c = 1. In this case (k ≤k min (n)) the NON will collapse even if a single node fails. Using Eqs. (34) , for p c = 1, we find
which is independent of α (see Ref. [36] for α = 0). In fact, when all n interdependent ER networks have a minimum average degreek min , the ER networks are at critical condition, and the NON collapses even if a single node fails irrespective of whether it is high degree or low degree. This is an inherent property of interdependent networks and is not influenced by the probability that nodes are attacked. For the case of a treelike NON formed of n SF networks,
is the degree distribution of nodes of network i, where k, M and m are the degree, maximum, and minimum degree of network i respectively [4, 27, 31] . The critical thresholds p c of the NON are obtained from Eqs. (9)- (15) and (23)- (24), and are presented in Fig. 6 . Figure 6(a) shows that p c for interdependent SF networks is nonzero for the entire range of α, which differs from that of a single SF network for which p c = 0 [4, 5, 31, 35] . For fixed n, p c increases when α increases since the NON becomes less robust and the high degree nodes are removed with a higher probability. Also, with the same probability of removing nodes (fixed α) the NON system becomes more vulnerable when the number of networks increases, as seen in Fig. 6 . When lower degree nodes are removed with a higher probability, Fig. 6(b) shows that the NON becomes less robust with increasing λ. This is also illustrated for α = 0 and 1 in Figs. 6(c) and 6(d) , where p c becomes larger with larger λ. 
IV. THE PARTIALLY INTERDEPENDENT STARLIKE NON
We now study the robustness of a starlike partially interdependent NON (see Fig. 7 ) using the analytical framework provided in Eqs. (23) (24) . Using the dynamics of cascading failures shown in Fig. 7 , we compare the theoretical results of Eqs. (9)- (15) and (21)- (22) with the simulation results in Fig. 8 for a starlike NON formed of five ER networks. t=1 t=3,5,7,9,11,... Fork i =k, q i1 = q 1i = q, p 1 = p 2 = · · · = p n = p and α = 1, by using the generating function of ER networks and Eqs. (16)- (20) and (23)- (24), we obtain
From Eqs. (37)- (39), we obtain
Substituting Eqs. (37) and (40) into Eqs. (41) and (42), we obtain
Furthermore, the giant components of networks are
where f 1 and f 2 are obtained from Eqs. (44) From Eqs. (44) and (45), we obtain
where u = W (pkek) k . From Eqs. (46) and (48)-(49), the critical threshold p c as a function of n for different q is obtained and shown in Fig. 10(a) . We see that for α = 1 the central network becomes significantly more vulnerable with increasing n for the same coupling strength q. In addition, for the same n the central network becomes more robust when the coupling strength q is reduced. Figure 10(b) shows that using Eqs. (9)- (15) and (23)- (24) these conclusions can also be demonstrated for α = −1. Figures 10(a) and 10(b) also show that the central network becomes more robust for the same coupling strength q and n when nodes of lower degree have a higher probability of failure. We also analyze p c as a function of the average network degree for different α as shown in Figs. 10(c) and 10(d). Figure 10(c) shows that the central network becomes more fragile and finally collapses as the average degree is decreased for the same coupling strength. Comparing Figs. 10(c) and 10(d) we see that when nodes of lower degree have a higher failure probability (α = −1), the central network is more robust for the same average degree and fixed coupling strength. Therefore, in the partially starlike NON, if we decrease the number of networks and the coupling strength and increase the average network degree, it will become more robust. In summary, by introducing a new targeted attack probability function which avoids singularities for degree k i = 0 and α < 0, we address the question of robustness of two types of NON under targeted attack: (i) a treelike network comprised of n fully interdependent Erdős-Rényi or Scale-free networks, and (ii) a starlike network comprised of n partially interdependent Erdős-Rényi networks. For the treelike NON of n fully interdependent ER networks under targeted attack, we find an exact solution for the giant component P ∞ when α = 1, as a function of 1 − p initial fraction of removed nodes from each of the n networks. Analytical solutions are found for the critical fraction p c that leads to the fragmentation of n interdependent networks, and the minimum averagek min at which the NON becomes so vulnerable that the failure of a single node will bring down the entire system. For different values of α, we present the numerical solution for the giant component and the critical fraction p c as a function ofk and n for ER and SF networks. When a treelike network of n fully interdependent ER networks is under targeted attack, increasing the average degree of each of the networks, increasing the probability of targeted attacks on lower degree nodes, and decreasing the number of networks will make the tree more robust. For a starlike network of n partially interdependent ER networks we can use these same strategies, but we can also decrease the coupling strength to make the starlike NON more robust. We also find the critical threshold q c for different α values below which the system exhibits a second order transition and above which the system shows a first order transition. When the coupling strength q = 0, the NON system become n single and independent n networks. When α is increasing or decreasing, the network becomes more vulnerable or robust, which coincides with the classic percolation of a single network to targeted network. 
